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Abstract 
 I describe the economic impact of the European Union (EU) on the EU’s subnational 
communities and explain the various ways in which European integration influences and shapes 
subnational behavior. Comprehending the ever-increasing role of the subnational entities 
reveals why the EU might be responsible for the sudden rise in subnational separatist 
mobilization. Moreover, understanding the economic grievances and the public opinion of the 
subnational regions helps us understand why the separatist sentiment, particularly in Catalonia, 
has risen during the EU economic crisis. 
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Preface 
I was born and raised in Serbia, in a family filled with many relatives, who experienced 
and lived to tell me tales about the rise and fall of the Serbian monarchy, the rise of Tito and the 
Communist regime, and about the devastating, politically entwined and culturally complex 
events of the Bosnian War. However, the tales about Kosovo and its historical, nationalistic 
importance have struck me the most. I was never fully able to comprehend the reasons behind 
Kosovo’s separatist sentiment. Confusion arose, mostly due to a combination of my patriotic 
upbringing and my personal belief that political and economic policies have a significant impact 
on the enhancement of separatist claims. Because of my personal experience with Kosovo, I 
became very interested in the ways nation states dealt with different ethnicities and various 
means of reconciling political, cultural, and economic grievances of subnational regions. Since I 
have done extensive research on Kosovo, and I have personal ties to the region, there is a 
possibility of a biased thesis, so I have decided to shift my focus from Kosovo to the EU 
subnational separatist movements. Serbia is on its way toward becoming a full member of the 
EU and I believe that this research will help me and other people have a better understanding as 
to what enhances subnational separatist sentiment at a supranational level. Consequently, this 
thesis could possibly spark ideas about how to resolve ethnic, economic, and cultural differences 
between regions and their respective nation-states.  
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The Economic Impact of the EU on Subnational Separatist Sentiment	  
Introduction	  
Some historical struggles among EU member states have decreased due to the European 
Union’s overarching agenda of “unity in diversity”. However, in the last decade, certain cultural 
and historical differences among EU regions have resurfaced, and are being driven by the 
economic crisis. As European Union decision-making bodies are trying to overcome economic 
imbalance among the EU member states, “old demons of regional separatism” are reappearing.1 
Several European Union regions are experiencing economic deprivation and perceived denial of 
political participation, which is intensifying separatist claims and requests for more autonomous 
regional governance upon the EU decision-making bodies. Since the European Union offers an 
economic safe haven to its subnational entities, the pursuit of regional self-determination is not 
only a domestic but also an EU matter. Many regional entities have benefited significantly from 
being a part of the EU; when domestic economies struggle, subnational entities such as 
Catalonia, Scotland, or Flanders, may be more inclined to seek separation from their nation-
states. 
Historically, demands for separation of regional entities such as Catalonia have boomed 
during hard times. An economic theory of secession suggests that wealthier regions are more 
likely to pursue independence, due to nation-states’ reliant economic behavior. Economic crisis, 
especially, activates latent separatist claims. I argue that the EU has stimulated its subnational 
entities in their pursuit of separatism by offering various economic and political channels. The 
EU facilitates separatism through a direct channel (offering money to the regions) and an indirect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cody, E. (2012, November 4). Separatists Gaining Ground in Europe. The Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/separatists-gaining-ground-in-europe-8280904.html 
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channel (lowering the opportunity cost of secession). These effects are amplified during the hard 
economic times.  
The creation of the EU has led to a devolution of authority thus making the nation-state 
insufficient to manage everyday life while consequently making subnational regions gain in 
importance. Counterintuitively, EU’s supranational integration, involves national disintegration 
meaning regions are acquiring more power at a subnational level. EU’s subnational regional 
actors have acquired a more important role, and they have gained in authority and in the ability 
to influence decision-making at a national and supranational level. Since the establishment of the 
EU, there has a been a rise in transnational associations and bureaucracies dealing exclusively 
with regional demands, thus leading to an increase in budget and funds being given to regional 
governments. These funds provide subnational governments with more self-reliance, and belief 
that its economic, cultural and political growth depends on the EU rather than on the national 
governments. This implies that the EU facilitates separatism through a direct channel, by 
offering money to the regions. 
The EU’s devotion to integration among nation-states and their respective regions has 
made it very difficult to have a homogenous national interest. The leader of Spain, Mariano 
Rajoy, and the leader of UK, David Cameron are having a problematic time finding suitable 
solutions to their ambiguous “national” agendas. Incorporating regional needs into each political 
schema is of great significance, especially if regions, such as Catalonia or Scotland, are very 
adamant about seceding. In cases, such as when the nation-state is unable to keep the 
unemployment low and balanced, or when the economic crisis and austerity measures are too 
harsh, subnational regions tend to express their grievances and their grief directly to EU 
representatives. This implies that the nation-states are prone to fragment, and that the EU’s 
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involvement in national domestic affairs involves direct and indirect economic impacts on 
separatist sentiment in subnational regions. 
The first part of the paper describes the European Union multilevel governance and the 
ever-increasing role of the subnational regions within the EU “federal system”. This part will 
also emphasize the extent to which the European Union hinders national sovereignty, and ways 
in which it impacts the relationship between subnational regions and nation-state’s authority. 
This beginning part of my thesis will additionally describe a theory of economic separatism. This 
section is important, because it is essential to have an understanding of what economic 
separatism embodies, in order to comprehend the scope of the EU’s political influence the 
subnational, national and supranational levels.  
The second part focuses on the current scholarly debate over the EU’s impact on 
subnational separatist sentiment, and it is split into two parts. The first chapter deals with 
working emphasizing the influence of the EU integration on subnational demands for 
independence.  Correspondingly, the first part of the paper will try to portray different aspects of 
European Union influence on the regional entities, along with an evaluation of whether 
regionalist parties are more likely to enter national competition because the vision of an 
independent region within Europe seems more viable. The second chapter focuses on the work of 
Dawn Brancati and her critique of European integration. Brancati argues that European 
integration does not cause a rise in separatist activity. In general, I seek to summarize what 
scholars know about how the EU encourages or discourages subnational separatism; my theory 
of economic secession and the evidence I will elaborate seeks to contribute to this literature.  
In the third part of my thesis I will elaborate my theory and my hypothesis.  Since my 
research question concerns various ways in which the EU economy impacts subnational 
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separatist sentiment, my independent variables will focus on the economic aspects of the EU. I 
argue that the EU regional funds, regional unemployment, and regional real GDP in the 
respective EU member states, hinder nation-states’ authority and further boosts subnational 
separatist sentiment. Along with a description of the economic situation in the EU, the third part 
will also focus on explaining public opinion on the perceived economic situation in the EU and 
in the constituent nation-states. It is important to understand how the public perceives the 
situation in the EU, especially the Catalan public, since it represents my case study. I will make a 
comparison between the EU economy, distribution of EU regional funds and public support for 
separatism in order to make significant conclusions about the ways in which the EU 
economically impacts subnational entities.  
The fourth part elaborates and implements my research design. In this section I will go 
further into what type of data and methods I will be using in order to assess the extent to which 
the EU economy indeed has an effect on subnational separatist sentiment. Furthermore, in this 
section I will discuss my quantitative findings, and give a prefatory note into my case study, 
which represents the fifth part of my thesis. In my case study I will summarize the data found in 
the previous section, along with examining how the European economy shapes separatist 
sentiment in Catalonia. 
I. Two models of the European Union: State-Centric vs. the EU Multi-Level System	  
 Throughout the existence of the European Union, there have been several debates as to 
the extent to which the EU hinders member states autonomy and impacts individual states’ 
relationships with their subnational regions. Since its creation in 1958 the EU has increased its 
scope of influence going from the creation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
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1952, to the creation of an economic and monetary union (EMU) in 1999.2 Since its 
establishment, the EU has made tremendous progress in giving a somewhat federal, 
constitutional look to first Western and then all of Europe. The Maastricht treaty, operative from 
1993, established the European Union under its current name, while the Lisbon treaty of 2009 
strives toward “enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to 
improving the coherence of its action.”3 Opponents of the treaty argue that the constitutional 
basis of the Lisbon treaty centralizes the EU, thus provoking a democratic deficit by moving 
power away from national electorates.4 	  
 The question that arises from the EU’s development and its gradual deepening is whether 
these European developments “consolidate or weaken national states”.5 Hooghe & Marks, in 
their work “Multi-Level Governance and European Integration,” separate and evaluate the two 
“alternative conceptions” – state centric governance and multi-level governance.6 The state-
centric point of view states that member state sovereignty is by no means challenged or 
threatened by European integration. The supporters of the state-centric system argue that the EU, 
as an institution, empowers and strengthens national sovereignty. From this perspective, 
European integration is driven by mutual bargaining among the states; no government is forced 
to integrate more than it wishes.7 Additionally, policy outcomes reflect the interest of particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. (pp. 1). Boston: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers.	  
3 (2008). Consolidated Lisbon Treaty. Foundation for EU Democracy, 14. Retrieved from 
http://www.europe.bg/upload/docs/Consolidated_LISBON_TREATY_3.pdf	  
4 Bonde, J. P. (2007). From EU Constitution to EU Treaty . Foundation for EU Democracy, Group for 
Independence and Democracy in the European Parliament, p. 46. Retrieved from 
http://www.tuks.nl/docs/From_EU_Constitution_to_Lisbon_Treaty_april_2008.pdf	  
5 Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. (pp. 1). Boston: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers.	  
6 Ibid, p. 2	  
7 Here, Hooghe & Marks are reviewing the literature written by Andrew Moravcsik, who is responsible for putting 
forward some core ideas of the state-centric model. 
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nation states. State-centrists view supranational authority as having little effect on policy 
outcomes.	  
 An alternative view to the state-centric model is the multi-level system, which has a 
political, economic, and somewhat social influence on the subnational, national and, 
supranational level. Although national governments participate in the EU decision-making, the 
supranational EU institutions exert considerable control over policy making. The multilevel 
system does not prohibit states from participating at the EU level, but the “state no longer 
monopolizes” policymaking.8 Furthermore, EU institutions, such as the executive Commission, 
the democratic European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, have their own voice and 
national governments cannot project their influence into them.9 Additionally, domestic issues are 
interconnected, and thus this extends to the EU level. While national governments play a big 
role, subnational actors are gaining importance. Subnational actors operate on both levels, 
supranational and national, and, along the way, they create “transnational associations”.10 The 
national governments do not represent the middle layer between domestic and international 
politics, but rather they share their activities in their respective territories.11 Overall, the official 
power holder and policy guide has changed and the individual state sovereignty is being 
challenged by the EU multilevel system of governance. This implies that subnational entities 
have the means of confronting and challenging nation-states authority. The EU has become a 
higher body of authority to which many strong-nationalist regional entities, with a history of 
political struggle with their nation state, seek resolution and political support. EU multi-level 
governance has provided less national economic dependence, and more political freedom to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. (pp. 2). Boston: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers.	  
9 Ibid, p. 2	  
10 Ibid, p. 78 
11 Ibid, p. 69 
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regional entities thus, potentially impacting the confidence of independence-minded regional 
entities.  
I. I. What is economic separatism? 
 Besides political, cultural and social reasons behind separatism, economic factors are 
highly influential when it comes to causes and re-exacerbations of existing political separatist 
claims. The economic theory of secession states that regions with previously established 
separatist intentions are more likely to have higher demands for independence during an 
economic downturn.12 In the regions where separatist claims are reoccurring, their respective 
nation states use economic policy as a way to make peace. Perceptions of economic injustice 
represent one of the most important reasons as to why certain regions have high demands for 
independence.13 These perceptions depend upon the “region’s relative economic situations within 
the state”.14 Regions with low income tend to believe that their regions do not get enough 
domestic or foreign investment, political representation, etc. On the other hand, wealthier regions 
believe that they contribute a lot to the central budget, but they do not get enough capital 
investment. Additionally, wealthier regions are usually dissatisfied with their representation in 
the national government, along with having too little control over its own resources. Regions 
such as Catalonia and Scotland differ from the rest of the country in terms of its wealth. These 
regions are much more prosperous than the rest of the country, and their separatist claims are 
based on the fact that their national governments are taking advantage and benefiting 
significantly from their well-off economic situation, thus putting the region itself into an 
unpropitious economic situation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Spencer, M. (1998). Separatism, Democracy and Disintegration . (p. 69). New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
13 Ibid, p. 70	  
14 Ibid, p. 71 
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 In many subnational regions seeking political separation from their nation state, several 
question have escalated concerning separatist sentiment. These are: 
a) What portion of the central budget, along with capital investment is allocated to the 
region? 
b) What portion of taxes the region contributes to the center? 
c)  How much autonomy in decision-making do regions have, when it comes to economic 
issues? 
d) What is the extent of foreign trade and external funding?15 
The answers to these questions are indicators of economic concerns that thrive in cases in 
which “the region is often underscored by the leaders of the nationalist movement”.16 In this 
paper, I will discuss European regional investments –i.e., “regional funds”-- being provided to 
the subnational entities by the EU Commission. Besides exploring external funding given to 
subnational regions, I will focus on the unemployment and real GDP, as indicators of the 
regional well-being.  
 Nonetheless, before going into the nuances of my economic theory of seccession, which 
focuses on direct and indirect effects of EU integration, and my case study, it is crucial to argue 
opposing ideas as to whether the EU encourages or damps subnational separatist claims. 
Understanding this will, in turn, provide context for understanding the direct and indirect 
economic effects of European integration on subnational separatism.  
II. I.  European Union as a Medium for Separatist Claims 
 Since its establishment, the European Union has witnessed a rise in its supranational 
power and an increase of authority among the EU members’ respective territories. Meaning, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Spencer, M. (1998). Separatism, Democracy and Disintegration . (p. 71). New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc  
16 Ibid, p. 71	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there is a diffusion of power upward (to Europe) and downward (to regions) from nation states. 
This shift of power among the member states and the EU is referred to as “authority diffusion”. 
Key causes behind the decline of a nation’s authoritative and centralized power are the rise in 
subnational political potential, symbolizing the authority shift beneath the state, and European 
integration which embodies the authority shift above the respective state.17 Nonetheless, this 
argument is counterintuitive, since the EU supranational governance should be strengthening 
nation states, rather than weakening them.  	  
 Hooghe & Marks argue that the rise of power in the EU and the authority shift in 
subnational entities is caused by two different singularities. The success of European integration 
can be ascribed to various geopolitical (e.g. defeat of Germany, Cold War context), economic 
(e.g., continuum of trade relations) and sociocultural factors (e.g., demands for more peaceful 
relations).18 However, explanations for the rise in subnational authority and the rise in its 
regional influence on the political, economic and social level are far more complex. Due to 
policy overload, financial stress and regional economic rivalry, national governments might 
decide to decentralize some of their capabilities. Furthermore, unbalanced economic 
development, rising competition among the subnational and national competencies, and “fear of 
cultural globalization” are also factors that interrelate with subnational demands for greater self-
rule.19	  
 However, separatist claims also reflect national governments’ efforts to work around 
subnational entities by shifting decision-making to the EU level.20 The European Union 
represents a medium for establishing economic ties and trade with other countries. Nonetheless, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. (pp. 69). Boston: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers.	  
18 Ibid, p. 69	  
19 Ibid, p. 70	  
20 Ibid, p. 77	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in order to increase its economic standing, a country must comply with EU rules. This requires 
deeper economic integration. Once national leaders establish their agenda, they naturally need to 
sacrifice some of their powers and control in service to market integration.21 As Hooghe & 
Marks emphasize, one noticeable consequence of these types of national reforms is that they lead 
to a greater evolution of the EU and a substantial power shift into the “EU arena”.22 Although 
national leaders are trying to avoid and maneuver their way out of possible cooperation with 
their regional entities, “actors learn, and they mobilize to counter last move outcomes.”23 This 
means that those that are threatened with being left out of the decision making process will 
accommodate themselves to the political situation.  
Subnational actors, in particular, have used EU very wisely throughout the years in order 
to pursue their separatist claims. The EU’s subnational entities have developed a network of 
influence within the EU system, by establishing liaison offices within the EU, creating trans-
regional organizations, connecting directly with EU officials, demanding recognition of the 
subsidiarity principle, and in many other ways.24 The subsidiarity principle, articulated in article 
5 of the treaty on European Union, seeks to devolve decisions to the lowest feasible 
governmental level, and to guarantee a degree of independence for lower authorities in relation 
to a higher body of government.25 
Additionally, supranational actors, such as the EU, seek to make allies within the member 
state’s dominion –the domestic arena-- in order to offset the central (national) government.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. (pp. 77). Boston: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers.	  
22 Ibid, p. 77	  
23 Ibid, p. 77	  
24 Ibid, p. 78 
25 (2013). The Principle of Subsidiarity. (p. 2), European Parliament , Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.2.pdf 
26 Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. (p.78). Boston: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
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European Commission officials, particularly, have an incentive to aid subnational actors by 
providing them with funds and especially with political access to European Union decision-
making bodies. 27	  
 Seth Jolly agrees with Hooghe & Marks that deeper European integration leads to an 
increase in regionalist movements.28 However, in contrast to Hooghe & Marks, who approached 
the problem more descriptively, Jolly investigates the question more theoretically. Using a 
dataset covering all EU subnational regions from 1950 until 1997, Jolly tests hypotheses 
regarding EU effects on “both the incidence and success of regionalist parties competing in 
national elections.”29 His findings demonstrate that deeper integration of the EU has caused a 
rise in regionalist parties’ participation in national elections.30 By increasingly participating in 
national elections, regionalist parties have become more competitive.31 This implies that 
subnational regionalist parties are rising in importance, and can present a potentially significant 
political threat to national leaders. By becoming more proactive about certain political issues, 
regionalist parties raise awareness of issues such as economic dependency, economic 
exploitation and strong patriotic attachment to their respective regions. Concerns such as these, 
as economic theory of secession suggests, lead to an increase in separatist claims. 	  
 Besides finding a correlation between the rise in regionalist parties and EU integration, 
Jolly tries to ascertain the many factors that have contributed to the rise in regionalist parties. 
First, historically larger states (meaning larger market size), had more economic success. 
However, with the creation of the EU and with the decrease in barriers to trade, the significance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. (pp. 78). Boston: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers. 
28	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of size has diminished.33 Today, with a more globalized world and the spread of free trade 
agreements, smaller countries can be very successful.34 This implies that once a country becomes 
part of the EU, due to many economic benefits, the importance of national market size is 
diminished. This can boost the confidence of regionalist parties in national elections by lowering 
the opportunity cost of secession. Hooghe & Marks also contend that “The single European 
market reduces the economic penalty imposed by regional political autonomy because regional 
norms continue to have access to the European market."35 The advantage larger states used 
diminishes due to the EU’s regional financial assistance, monetary policy, foreign policy, and 
free trade.36 This indicates, that smaller regional entities are being encouraged by the EU to seek 
more autonomy, thus causing a rise in regional confidence and a possible increase in separatist 
claims.  
Second, since the end of WWII and the creation of the European Union, most European 
countries no longer have the same external security concerns that animated them during the Cold 
War.37 In a situation where smaller regional entities, such as Scotland or Catalonia do achieve 
sovereignty, they would still stay protected by NATO or other superpowers.38 Many argue that a 
more globalized world and the existence of various international organizations reduces the risk 
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& Littlefield Publishers 
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of wars and makes cooperation and bargaining among states more likely to take a positive 
route.39  
Finally, besides economic and security issues, Jolly also addresses the issue of 
homogeneity. He argues that a government with a more homogeneous populace is more likely to 
be more successful at adopting policies that benefit a majority of the people. This argument 
implies that a homogenous government, meaning a government with racial, ethnic, and cultural 
confluence of equal rights, is more likely to provide an equal provision of goods and benefits, 
due to a more homogenous and like-minded population. Likewise, larger states are likely to be 
less efficient at equal and beneficial public provision of goods.40 This argument suggests that 
larger states are more likely to be heterogeneous, meaning, larger states are more culturally and 
ethically diverse.  
Due to all these economic, security, and cultural issues, European subnational regionalist 
parties may see themselves as being capable of having sustained economic growth and cultural 
freedom independently from the traditional nation-state. As a result of their rise in political 
confidence, subnational regionalist entities are requesting political freedom and secession. The 
arguments in findings in both Hooghe & Marks and Jolly demonstrate that the EU may have a 
tremendous effect on the subnational movements, especially on the rise in regionalist parties.  
II.II. A critique of the correlation between the EU and the rise in separatism claims 	  
  Only a few scholars have truly challenged this idea that the EU facilitates separatist 
claims. According to Dawn Brancati, European integration does not lead to a rise in separatist 
movements. She argues that the economic benefits provided by the EU are neither large nor 
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positive enough to impact separatist demands among most regions.41 Brancati tests her 
arguments with a quantitative analysis of regional demands in post-WWII Europe. She finds that 
European integration is “only weakly associated with a modest increase in electoral support for 
separatist parties, particularly in economically advanced regions.”42 	  
Brancati argues that even though economic integration and the rise in separatism 
movements are “statistically correlated, they are not casually linked.”43 This argument Brancati 
makes, suggests that one does not cause another, or that the EU integration does not cause the 
rise in separatist movements. The reason for the lack of causation as Brancati points out, is the 
lack of benefits, or the complex political environment that hinders the fair distribution of benefits 
among the EU regions. Additionally, according to Brancati’s article, allowing regions to have 
more control over their social, political, and economic affairs, leads to a more peaceful 
relationship between the nation state and the seceding region, thus making secession less viable 
within the EU. Likewise, when it comes to the national budget and taxes, Brancati argues that 
decentralization lessens the desire for independence by allowing regional entities to collect their 
own taxes.44 Contrary to Jolly, who argues that linguistic and cultural homogeneity of a region 
leads to a likely secession, Brancati argues that decentralization reduces a region’s desire to 
secede by allowing regional governments autonomy over educational and cultural issues.45 
Making subnational entities such as Catalonia or Scotland satisfied with their economic and 
political standing within a nation-states reduces the likelihood of secession, thus leading to a 
more peaceful and stress-free relationship with the EU. Although, there is a possibility for 
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regionalist parties to be empowered by the nation-state decentralization, Brancati contends that 
decentralization reduces the incentives for “parties to compete state-wide by reducing the power 
of national legislatures and, thereby, giving parties fewer incentives to merge with each other in 
order to control the national government.”46 As Brancati points out, due to many inter-correlated 
domestic issues, regionalist parties might not find it feasible or economically beneficial to seek 
independence through EU political forums. 	  
Subnational separatist movements do not always find the European Union’s institutional 
policies and its centralized, administrative system very attractive. Within a country, certain 
regions might benefit more because they attract more foreign direct investment.47 Likewise, 
various benefits within a region might vary along different segments of the population.48 Another 
reason as to why the EU is unlikely to promote subnational mobilization is due to its very strict 
accession requirements. Once a subnational entity accomplishes its goal of becoming a sovereign 
state, it will most likely seek to become a member of the EU. Meeting the EU accession 
requirements is a long and difficult process, which supports Brancati’s theory that European 
integration makes it difficult and unlikely for subnational regionalist parties to seek 
independence.  
II.III. Literature review summary	  
As many scholars emphasize, understanding how the EU operates and what its core 
values are becomes important when one wants to determine ways in which the EU influences 
specific nation states and their regions. Many scholars argue that the European Union is a 
multilevel system of governance, and as such, it symbolizes a diffusion of power. This implies 
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that subnational authority beneath the nation-state is gaining in importance, while supranational 
integration represents the rise of power and influence above the respective nation-states.  
Nonetheless, behind the EU’s multilevel governance, there exists a simultaneous process of 
uniting independent nations into one diverse political and cultural community. However, this 
process provokes a lot of challenges. Hooghe & Marks, along with Seth Jolly, argue that the EU 
nation states cope with a lot of subnational movements due to the EU’s involvement and 
participation in the nations’ internal domestic affairs. These scholars also argue that, due to many 
social, economic, and political difficulties at the EU level, small regional entities (ex. Catalonia), 
see the opportunity to pursue their rights of autonomy and independence. Due to the European 
Union’s inability to solve some of its most persistent and pressing problems, such as the 
weaknesses of the common market, deficit, unequal regional funding, and social antagonisms, 
the EU is enabling these separatist movements. The EU and its policies are strengthening 
regional self-rule and enhancing nationalistic identity among these separatist groups. In contrast 
to previously mentioned scholars, Dawn Brancati argues the opposite. She is not very convinced 
that the EU plays a vastly influential role in subnational mobilization. Due to the EU’s 
complicated economic, political, and cultural scheme, subnational entities are discouraged by the 
EU in their pursuit of self-rule. Brancati argues that the economic benefits provided by the EU 
are high enough to keep regional entities satisfied, without causing subnational dissatisfaction 
and the rise in separatist sentiment. However, my theory suggests that nation states, along with 
the EU, use economics to make peace with these troublesome independence-minded regions. 
However, once the economic deprivation and lack of economic resources, such as unemployment 
and low income, presents itself, separatist claims resurface thus making the nation states, and the 
EU in particular, accountable for them.  
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Overall, in the last couple of decades, the EU, as a multilevel polity, has increased its 
regional significance and its influence on the nation states. A combination of the EU’s possible 
fragmentation, political crisis, and vague federal, territorial integrity, sheds light on whether 
subnational mobilization increases because of the historical and national differences or 
specifically because of the EU’s difficult economic situation and harsh economic policies. 	  
III. Economic integration and regionalist sentiment: direct and indirect effects 
	  
My theory, that the EU impacts subnational separatist sentiment, is drawn from the 
economic theory of secession. The economic theory of secession suggests that when regional 
entities that have an already preexistent separatist battle with their respective nation-states face a 
difficult economic situation, they will experience an increase in separatist behavior. I also argue 
that economics represent a casual determinant of secession. My theory suggests that the 
European Union’s richer subnational regions are more likely to secede because they are different 
from the rest of the country in terms of wealth, natural resources, and economic sustainability. 
The economic policies employed by the nation-state and the EU cause grievances in the 
subnational regions, and thus create a catalyst for separatism. While the standard economic 
theory of secession focuses solely on the implementation of nation-states’ economic measures as 
an indicator of regional separatist sentiment, my theory focuses on the economic measures 
implemented specifically by EU’s supranational authority. I acknowledge that the EU is not the 
main and only reason why separatist claims are taking place. Regions such as Catalonia, 
Scotland, or Flanders have a long and extensive history within and without their current nation-
states. Their nationalistic sentiment and patriotic attachment to the region represents the main 
social, cultural, and political base for the foundation of the separatist sentiment. Nonetheless, 
certain regionalist groups, such as Catalan, Scottish or Flemish regionalist parties, has pressed 
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their nation states for more autonomy and more resolute separatist rights.  Throughout the years, 
voting behavior in national elections has changed, and the percentage of votes going to 
regionalist parties has increased. My theory contends that as the national and European economy 
has worsened, discontent among the regional population rose, leading to a rise in support for the 
regionalist parties, which has finally led to an increase in separatist sentiment.  
In examining my theory, I have employed a statistical research analysis of the EU 
economy, which relies on data collected by the Eurostat, Inforegio and Europa. Eurostat has 
provided me with unemployment and real GDP stats in all EU regions, while Inforegio and 
Europa were useful for obtaining distribution of regional funds across EU regions. Additionally, 
I have acquired public opinion data on the EU regional attachment from the European Election 
Database. In order to make significant conclusions about the economic theory of secession taking 
place in European Union, I will compare regional unemployment, regional real GDP data and 
distribution of regional funds, with the regional attachment public opinion data.  
In my next section, I give descriptions of my independent and dependent variables, and 
then I provide more in-depth explanations of my statistical analysis of the EU economy and 
regional vote share. Secondly, I define and test my hypotheses. I am planning on employing 
other subject-relevant articles and books further on in my thesis research. Other than doing a 
statistical analysis, in my methodology section, I will apply my theoretical findings onto my case 
study of Catalonia.  
III.I. Dependent variable 
Subnational separatist sentiment   
Since its creation in 1958, the EU supranational system encountered many problems that 
nation-states brought into its multilevel polity. Countries such as Spain, UK, and Belgium, have 
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had a prolonged historical fight with their subnational entities in order to stop fragmentation and 
separatist movements. Desire to separate oneself escalates when one group feels discriminated 
against, oppressed, or held back from obtaining economic benefits. Separatist feelings represent 
a threat to the integrity of the nation-state, and in this case, separatist movements might 
destabilize peace and highlight some of the EU’s deficiencies. Due to its interconnectedness with 
the economies of national governments, the overall EU economic situation directly affects every 
single member state and its regional entities. I argue that a predefined regionalist sentiment can 
awaken when put in a difficult economic situation. Meaning, wealthier regions with a firm 
patriotic attachment to its geographical entity that are being economically challenged by the 
nation state, may have a higher chance of experiencing a rise in regionalist separatist sentiment.  
 The reason why I chose regional attachment as an indicator of public support for 
separatism is due to my belief that data on regional attachment represents a significant sign of 
strong regional identity.  In the case of a diverse federation such as EU, data on regional 
attachment might be helpful in determining whether nation states still play a major role in the 
political and economic relationship with the EU. 
 Due to a lack of more substantive data on the regional public support, I have focused on 
the regional vote share in the national parliamentary elections. I have decided to better my 
research by redefining regional attachment itself. Besides representing a strong sentiment and 
identity toward its regionalist culture, regional attachment is also represented through the amount 
of political, and electoral support it acquires from the regional population. Thus, I have 
conducted an analysis of the percentage of votes EU regionalist parties have acquired in the 
parliamentary elections. The European Election Database covers parliamentary, presidential and 
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European elections in 35 European countries, for two decades. 49This database covers regional 
election results according to “NUTS” level regions. The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics (NUTS) provides a “single uniform breakdown of territorial units for the production of 
regional statistics for the European union.”50 The NUTS classifies three levels of regions, NUTS 
1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3.51 Each member state is divided into NUTS 1 regions, which is in turn 
subdivided into NUTS 2 regions and so forth.52 I am focusing on the NUTS 2 level regions in the 
EU, due to a more comprehensive and overarching statistics available. In particular, EU regions 
seeking separatism such as Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders are NUTS 2 regions, thus justifying 
my use of NUTS 2 level regional classification.  
 In order to analyze regional attachment, I have used national parliamentary votes share 
throughout the nation-states regions. Subsequently, I have identified which parties are regionalist 
in order to find out its vote share throughout the years. So as to identify which parties are 
regionalist and which are not, I have used the members of the European Free Alliance 
organization (EFA), which is an organization that gathers “over 40 progressive, nationalist, 
regionalist, and autonomist parties all across the EU.”53 These regionalist parties represent 
minorities, stateless people and regions across the EU. 54EFA promotes the right to self-
determination, multi-level governance, devolution of power, as well as “nationalism, 
regionalism, autonomy and independence.” 55  
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 Besides, using EFA as an indicator of regionalism, I have looked at the website of each 
regionalist party, and I have employed other relevant newspaper articles, and works done by 
other scholars, in order to accurately identify which regionalist parties see themselves are 
pushing for more autonomy and stronger voice in the national parliament.  
 Overall, I do acknowledge that not all regionalist parties are pursuing the same political, 
social and economic settlements, however regional demands for greater autonomy range “from 
independence to devolution to cultural rights,” thus putting all regional demands into one 
bucket.56 Therefore, the percentage of vote share gives enough credibility to my use of regional 
parties vote share as an indicator of regional attachment.  
III.II. Independent variables 
The impact of the EU economy (Unemployment, real GDP) 
The reason why I chose these independent variables is because I argue that they are the 
best indicators of EU economy. In a macroeconomic context, regional unemployment and 
regional real GDP data are extremely relevant to the EU. Since the EU is highly interconnected 
with its member states, the EU economic situation affects every nation-state and its regional 
entity. 
 I have acquired data on the unemployment and on the real GDP in the EU regions from 
the Eurostat, NUTS 2 level classification. Since the economic theory of succession suggests that 
higher degrees of dissatisfaction among the population are correlated with the rise in separatist 
sentiment, I have conducted a small analysis using Eurobarometer Interactive public opinion 
website, in order to find out what were the biggest concerns at the EU level in the last ten years. 
The study has shown that at the EU level, unemployment along with an economic situation is 
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ranked highest in the Eurobarometer public opinion polls (Graph 1). This graph thus justifies my 
use of unemployment and real GDP as the most suitable indicators of the EU economy. 
GRAPH 1          
 
I did not discriminate other indicators of economy for any particular reason; I simply 
choose these as the best fit to my thesis. The point I am trying to get across by using these 
independent variables is to show that the EU’s economic measures are hard on people or for 
economic growth, job prospects, or long-term relationships with other member states of the EU. 
Ways in which economic measures taken by the EU dampen economic growth directly influence 
the strong subnational separatist sentiment. By affecting the nation-state’s economy, EU 
economic measures have a direct influence on the subnational regions, thus leading to 
frustration, especially in the cases in which subnational regions are economically prosperous, 
self-sufficient and have a previously established strong regional identity.  
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Regional funds distribution 
 Distribution of regional funds across the EU’s subnational regions represents a direct 
impact of the EU, and a fundamental part of my thesis research. In my opinion, the EU structural 
funds given to the EU’s subnational entities may play a major role in establishing a strong 
subnational separatist sentiment. These funds give more confidence to the subnational entities, 
by making them self-reliant and not heavily dependent on the nation-state’s financial assistance.  
I am using Inforegio as my primary source for acquiring information on the distribution 
of regional funds. European Union’s regional funds are divided into cohesion and structural 
funds. I am focusing on the EU Structural funds, which are divided into European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF).57 The ERDF was created in 1975 
and it is the largest fund provided by the EU that helps with infrastructure and by creating 
opportunities for small companies.58 The ESF was created in 1958 and its main purpose is to 
provide assistance to the underprivileged and disadvantaged portion of the EU population.59 
Since the structural funds cover both the economic and social welfare aspects that are necessary 
for a healthy and content population, it represents a suitable economic measure for my research.  
III.III. Hypothesis 
H1: As European Union regional funds increase, subnational separatist sentiment increases.  
In order to argue hypothesis #1, I will collect data on the distribution of the EU regional 
funds throughout the EU member states, from the Inforegio site. Inforegio is the department of 
the Commission of the European Union that deals with the EU regional issues. Its main mission 
is to provide statistics and other relevant data at the European level that support comparisons 
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between countries and regions.60 Furthermore, I will compare the amount of funds each region 
got throughout the years, with the election data, in order to see whether the amount of EU 
funding leads to an increase in subnational sentiment.    
Consequently, I will conduct a thorough analysis of the regional funds distribution and 
create graphs that may or may not imply that the regions getting the most regional funds are the 
ones with separatist claims.   
H2: The rise in regional unemployment and the decrease in regional real GDP growth, leads to 
a rise in regional separatist sentiment.  
 In order to evaluate hypothesis #2, I will look into the regional unemployment and 
regional real GDP data provided by the Eurostat website, compare it with the regional 
attachment public opinion data and consequently make a graph that will either prove that the EU 
economy does indeed have an effect, or it will reject my economic theory of secession. Once I 
identify regionalist parties, I will analyze the voting percentage each regionalist party received in 
the parliamentary elections, and then compare it to regional unemployment and real GDP. The 
analysis of regional electoral support, along with the economic analysis of the EU, will help me 
evaluate whether there is a correlation between the EU economy and public support for 
separatism.  
IV. Methodology 
Before continuing, it is important to revise the central question of my thesis. How do EU 
economic measures impact the subnational separatist sentiment? What is it about the EU 
economic measures that is so striking and salient that makes such a profound influence on the 
subnational separatist sentiment? These questions are significant because they have not been 
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fully explored by the academic community. My research into the effects of EU economic 
policies, will add to the debate about separatist claims and separatist sentiment in contemporary 
Europe. 
IV. I. Data analysis 
 A comparative analysis of regional vote share and EU structural funds, showed a negative 
relationship between these two variables. This analysis implies that when there is an increase in 
regional funds, regional party vote share decreases (Graph #2). The relationship between these 
variables disconfirms my hypothesis #1, by showing that the amount of structural funds has a 
negative correlation with the rise in separatist sentiment. 
GRAPH 2 (y - regional party vote share; x - Structural funds)  
                
 Thus, graph #2 concludes that regional funds are not significant enough in this analysis.	  
They are negatively associated with regional party vote share, and the money needed to change 
the vote share in any meaningful way would be in the billions of dollars. Furthermore, table #1 
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points out the relationship between the regional vote share and structural funds more 
numerically. It states that the correlation between regional vote share and structural funds is not 
solid enough to make ultimate conclusions.  
TABLE 1 
  
 In my second hypothesis, a comparative analysis of regional unemployment and regional 
vote share data also showed a negative relationship between the two variables (Graph 3). Thus 
implying that whenever regional unemployment increases, regional party vote decreases. This 
further on concludes that when economic situation is bad, regional political parties lose support.  
This particular analysis disconfirms my hypothesis #2, thus showing that European Union’s 
economic measures do not have an effect on regional political party support, aka separatist 
sentiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional Party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| {95% Conf. Interval} 
Structural funds -.0080156 .0025554 -3.14 0.002     -.0130402   -.0029911 
_cons 5.359458 .4825119 11.11 0.000 4.41073    6.308185 
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GRAPH 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
            
Furthermore, table #2 portraits the relationship more numerically. It emphasizes the 
negative and statistically significant relationship between regional unemployment and regional 
party vote share.  
TABLE 2 
  
Furthermore, I decided to look at the change in unemployment throughout the EU 
member states and compare it to the regional parties vote share. Nonetheless, the results came 
back the same. Table # 3 emphasizes that the change in unemployment does not have a 
significant effect on the rise in regional parties vote share.  
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Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P> | t | [95% Conf. Interval] 
Unemployment 
_cons 
-.1669738 
7.318709 
.0576341 
.6353923 
-2.90 
11.52 
0.004 
0.000 
-.2801345      -.053813 
6.071159        8.566259 
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TABLE 3 
 
Next, the analysis between real GDP growth and regional party vote share (graph #4) 
shows a positive relationship, thus concluding that whenever real GDP growth increases, 
regional party vote share increase too.  
GRAPH 4 
               
 Furthermore, table #4 emphasizes the relationship between real GDP and regional party 
vote share. It says that the relationship is positive and statistically significant at p<.10. 
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Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P. |t| {95% Conf. Interval} 
Unemployment -.1228807    .0892366     -1.38    0.169 -.2982636    .0525022 
Real GDP growth -.0102148    .1305256     -0.08 0.938 -.266746    .2463164 
Change in unemployment .1427661    .2665452      0.54 0.592 -.3810938     .666626 
_cons 6.247866    .9253829      6.75 0.000  4.429146    8.066586 
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TABLE 4 
Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P> | t | [95% Conf. Interval] 
GDP 
_cons 
.1811993 
5.572691 
.1042991 
.4479702 
1.74 
12.44 
0.083 
0.000 
-.0237589  .3861575 
4.692384    6.452997 
 
Table #5 emphasizes that when put together, these two findings about regional 
unemployment and real GDP growth indicate that when economy is doing well, meaning when 
unemployment is low and GDP is rising, regional political parties are gaining more support. 
However, when the economy is bad, aka when unemployment is high, and GDP is low, regional 
political parties have less support.  
TABLE 5 
Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P> | t | [95% Conf. Interval] 
Unemployment -.1058584 .0916409 -1.16 
 
0.249 
 
-.2859578  .074241 
GDP .1876969 .1076028 
 
1.74 
 
0.082 
 
-.023772   .3991658 
 _cons 6.518932 .8914731 7.31 0.000 4.766944   8.27092 
 
However, this analysis between regional vote share, unemployment, real GDP growth 
and structural funds is imperfect since regional vote share data are inconsistent, and takes place 
every 4 to 5 years. Thus providing a significantly small amount of data for analysis. The regional 
vote share data available starts in the early 1990s, however regional unemployment data starts in 
the early 2000s, which gives me an inconclusive analysis of the regional separatist sentiment 
growth. Additionally, there are 216 regions in total included in the analysis. Out of these 216 
regions, it is regions of Scotland, Catalonia, and Flanders that are very adamant about separating 
from the nation state. Regions such as South Tirol and Veneto in Italy have recently started 
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becoming more outspoken about its autonomous needs, however not many regions out of those 
216 being analyzed have demanded higher autonomy or separation from the nation state. Thus 
concluding that in this multiple analysis, regionalist separatist sentiment cannot be fully 
emphasized due to a small number of autonomous movements.  
Nonetheless, only one region addressing its secessionist needs is necessary to make my 
economic theory of secession more legitimate. I have addressed earlier that economic theory of 
secession is more likely to take place in more heterogeneous nations with diverse cultural, 
economic and social needs, which regions strive for more autonomy, and most importantly 
regions that have an already established separatist sentiment. In a globalized world we live in 
today, nation-states are able to use economic, political, diplomatic, or military tools to soothe 
separatist sentiment in their respective nation-states, thus disabling and disrupting a rise in 
separatist and autonomous demands. Nowadays, the nation-states are able to pacify 
heterogeneous agendas with various means, which might affect the regional party vote share, 
especially in countries that are highly centralized, and where the nation state is in control of the 
economic sector.  
There are several factors that are important in respect to addressing my hypothesis. More 
specifically I want to address the reasons as to why my analysis of unemployment, real GDP and 
structural funds have a bivariate effect on the rise of separatist sentiment in the European Union. 
First of, such as mentioned earlier, regional vote share is an imperfect indicator of subnational 
separatist sentiment, and as such it might have affected the final outcome of my analysis. Out of 
27 EU member states, I have included 18 member states in my analysis. EU member states of 
Malta, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Estonia, and Croatia are not split into NUTS 2 
level regions, thus I was not able to obtain their regional vote share. I did not include Slovenia in 
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my case study, since its regional vote share did not include years of the regional parliamentary 
elections, but rather just the percentage of vote share Furthermore, out of 18 countries and 216 
regions used in my study, 29 regions have shown to have a strong regional sentiment. I have 
used 10% or more as a threshold for strong and well-represented regional sentiment, since 10% 
in parliamentary elections, provides 10% representation in the government. Out of these 29 
regions, it is the regions of Catalonia (Spain), South Tirol (Italy), Wallonia and Flanders 
(Belgium) that have shown to be highly supportive and consistent with regional vote share. Out 
of 18 countries in my study, 6 countries had no regional representation or less than 1% regional 
party vote share. Overall, although a meaningful study, regional party vote share, in comparison 
to other variables, represents an imperfect tool for a separatist sentiment analysis.   
Secondly, I argue that countries that are more centralized have in fact a more unitary 
national sentiment, due to regional dependency on the central government. A unitary state is a 
state in which executive, legislative and judicial powers are concentrated in the central 
government.61 This implies that centralized political systems do not permit a separation of 
powers between central and subnational governments. Furthermore, centralization refers to fiscal 
centralization, in which countries have central planned economy. Additionally, fiscal 
centralization suggests that central government is responsible for tax revenues and for 
distribution of public goods.62 With respect to UK, which represents a highly centralized system 
with a strong separatist movement currently taking place, 22 other member states of the EU 
represent unitary states. Meaning, these 22 member states are centralized, with decision-making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Manikkalingam, R. (2003). A Unitary, a Federal or Two Separate States?. Social Scientists Association. 5. 
Retrieved from http://www.dialogueadvisorygroup.org/pdf/Unitary, Federal or Separate States_.pdf	  
62	  Albornoz, F., & Cabrales, A. (2010). Fiscal Centralization and Political Process . Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid, Working Papers , 3. Retrieved from http://e-
archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/6673/we100402.pdf;jsessionid=3807152DDFABABDC1770B427703D67
4A?sequence=1	  
	  	  
	  
36	  
powers being concentrated in the hands of the national government. This further implies that the 
national government is responsible for redistributing and implementing economic benefits across 
its respective regions. As such, governments that are more centralized, enjoy higher rates of 
national political parties, thus reducing the incidence and competitiveness of regional political 
parties. Furthermore, by having less, or any regional representatives in the national government, 
leads to regional underrepresentation and less emphasized regionalist sentiment.  
This further suggests, that a possible reason as to why the relationship between 
unemployment, real GDP, structural funds and regional party vote share was not more highly 
emphasized, was due to a small number of regional parties present in my analysis, and because 
majority of the EU member states have a unitary system of governance. Next, current regional 
studies have shown that regions have been empowered in 763 out of 28 EU member states, while 
664 other regions are considering on implementing various forms of regionalization. However, in 
1065 member states of the EU, regional authorities have started to gradually lose or have 
completely lost its regional power, due to nation-states reluctance to further pursue regional 
reforms.66 
On the contrary to centralized political systems, Germany, Austria, and Belgium are 
federal, decentralized governments. Spain represents a quasi federal state since it only has two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 These member states are: Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the UK, Poland and Greece.  
Schausberger, F. (2012). Devolution in the European Union and the Place for Local and Regional Self-government 
in EU Policy Making and Delivery. European Union, Committee of the Regions, 5. Retrieved from 
http://www.aer.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/MainIssues/Governance/2013-Publication_devolutionEU_EN.pdf 
64 These member states are: Romania, France, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Cyprus and the Czech Republic 
Ibid, p. 5 
65 These member states are: Denmark, Slovenia, Hungary, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland and 
the UK (concerning England as opposed to the devolved nations).  
Ibid. p. 5 
66 Ibid, p. 5	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regions with full autonomous powers (Navarro and Basque Country).67 On the contrary to the 
single source of authority and power in unitary political systems, federal political systems have 
two or more levels of government, in which decision-making powers are shared between the 
central and subnational units.68 Decentralization in the federal case refers to fiscal 
decentralization, which implies that central government entitles regional authorities with an 
increase in, or full fiscal autonomy over public sector.69 By increasing a degree in fiscal 
autonomy, national incumbents are no longer accountable to the regional population. It is the 
regional representatives that are being held responsible for the welfare and distribution of public 
goods. Decentralization symbolizes a devolution of power, and as emphasized in my literature 
review, with EU as a medium between the nation state and subnational entities, nation states are 
experiencing federalization and shift in authority and decision-making bodies. Meaning, regional 
authorities are gaining in importance, therefore pushing heterogeneous EU member states toward 
implementing more strict regional policies. These strict economic measures lead to a higher level 
of dissatisfaction in separatist-oriented regions. Due to a still-in-progress decentralization 
process, and nation-states reluctance to pursue regional reforms, my regional study has a small 
number of strong regional political parties, which are overwhelmed by the low numbers in 
regional parties support. 
Overall, countries that are experiencing decentralization, such as Spain and Belgium are 
experiencing a constant rise in separatist sentiment. Although my study shows a slight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Schausberger, F. (2012). Devolution in the European Union and the Place for Local and Regional Self-
government in EU Policy Making and Delivery. European Union, Committee of the Regions, 5. Retrieved from 
http://www.aer.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/MainIssues/Governance/2013-Publication_devolutionEU_EN.pdf 
The detail on Navarro and Basque Country having full autonomous powers is obtained from an LSE article by Carlo 
Basta, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2012/09/fiscal-crisis-and-the-balkanization-of-spain-which-way-forward/ 
68	  Manikkalingam, R. (2003). A Unitary, a Federal or Two Separate States?. Social Scientists Association , 6. 
Retrieved from http://www.dialogueadvisorygroup.org/pdf/Unitary, Federal or Separate States_.pdf	  
69 Sacchi, A., & Salotti, S. (2014). How Regional Inequality Affects Fiscal Decentralization: Accounting for 
Autonomy of Subcentral Governments. Environment and Planning C: Governemnt and Policy, 32, 145. Retrieved 
from http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=c1241r 
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relationship between real GDP and regional sentiment, and a negative relationship between 
unemployment, regional funds and regional sentiment, I argue that EU’s federal member states, 
that have high demands for regional separation, do indeed experience a positive relationship 
between EU economy and regional support for separatism. For these reasons, I have conducted a 
small analysis of federal versus centralized European member states. I have recognized 
Germany, Belgium, Austria and Spain as being federal member states, while the other 14 
countries in my study are acknowledged as being centralized governments. I have compared and 
looked at the relationship between all four variables (unemployment, real GDP growth, regional 
funds and regional vote share) in countries that are considered federalist and in countries that are 
considered as being centralized. Table #6 emphasizes that in federal countries, when real GDP 
growth increases, regional party vote share increases too. Whenever there is a 1% increase in real  
GDP growth, regional party vote share increases by .72%. This implies that whenever the 
EU economy is doing well, the regional sentiment in federal countries increases.  
TABLE 6 
 
Table #6 concludes that in federal countries with more autonomous regional entities, 
there indeed is a correlation between the rise in regional GDP growth and the rise in regional 
parties vote share. Thus concluding that in countries that already have a strong regional 
Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| {95% Conf. Interval} 
Real GDP growth .7158479 .3434964 2.08 0.040 .0332209    1.398475 
Unemployment -.0974997 .210157 -0.46 0.644 -.5151426    .3201432 
Structural funds -.0081987 .0052019 -1.58 0.119 -.0185363     .002139 
_cons 8.033962 2.196358 3.66 0.000 3.669163    12.39876 
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sentiment, the rise in real GDP growth has an effect on the regional attachment to political 
parties. Nonetheless, unemployment and regional funds still have a negative relationship with the 
percentage of regional vote share. Nonetheless, this analysis signifies that EU economy indeed 
has an effect on the subnational entities in the EU federal countries. 
Furthermore, table # 7 portrays a different relationship between unemployment, real GDP 
and federal countries. I have multiplied unemployment and real GDP with the federal countries, 
and the results have confirmed my previous findings. Unemployment has no effect in federal 
countries. However, whenever real GDP increases, regional party vote share increases too.  
TABLE 7 
 
Table #8 presents a relationship between my variables (unemployment, real GDP growth, 
regional funds and regional vote share) in centralized countries. The graph states that in 
centralized countries, when unemployment increases by 1%, regional party vote share decreases 
by .45%. Thus exemplifying previously established impression that in centralized countries 
regionalist parties are less competitive, and receive less popular support during an economic 
crisis. 
 
 
Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P. |t| {95% Conf. Interval} 
Real GDP growth -.0281048 .1238373 -0.23 0.821 -.2714833   .2152738 
Unemployment -.13263 .1053926 -1.26 0.209 -.339759     .074499 
 Federal 2.305779 1.873621 1.23 0.219 -1.376465    5.988023 
Real GDP x Federal 1.337918 .2458632 5.44 0.000 .8547203    1.821115 
Unemployment x Federal -.0163092 .1904574 -0.09 0.932 -.3906169    .3579985 
_cons 6.32309 1.021813 6.19 0.000 4.314911     8.331269 
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TABLE 8 
Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| {95% Conf. Interval} 
Real GDP growth -.0557908 .1627019 -0.34 
 
0.732 -.377142    .2655603 
 Unemployment -.4546496 .1749162 -2.60 0.010 -.8001252    -.109174 
 Structural funds -.0148936 -2.99 -2.99 
 
0.003 -.0247315   -.0050556 
_cons 9.074349 6.44 6.44 
 
0.000 6.289499     11.8592 
 
Furthermore, table #9 emphasizes the fact that in federal countries, regionalist parties get 
4% more of regional votes. Thus demonstrating that in federal countries regionalist parties are 
more competitive, meaning the regionalist sentiment is stronger. 
TABLE 9 
Regional party vote share Coef Std. Err. t P>|t| {95% Conf. Interval} 
GDP .1790712 .1589483 1.13 0.261 -.1339832    .4921257 
unemployment -.2812786 .1317385 -2.14 0.034 -.5407425   -.0218148 
structural funds -.0097562 .0034605 2.82 0.005 -.0165717   -.0029406 
Federal countries 4.055074 .9782137 4.15 0.000 2.128446    5.981701 
_cons 6.678257 1.20357 5.55 0.000 4.307783    9.048732 
 
In contrast to a random effects model I have previously described, I decided to conduct a 
fixed effects model, which takes into account countries specific effects, rather than treating 
variables as arising from random causes. Table #10 portrays the fixed effects model, and it 
mimics the previously established results. Unemployment has no effects on the rise in regional 
parties vote share, however real GDP growth portrays a positive relationship.  
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TABLE 10 
Regional party vote share Coef. Std. Err. t P. |t| {95% Conf. Interval} 
Unemployment .0634688    .0957631      0.66 0.508 -.1247631    .2517008 
 Real GDP -.1845424    .1164298     -1.59 0.114 -.4133969    .0443121 
Federal -1.237948    2.039156     -0.61 0.544 -5.246115    2.770219 
Real GDP_Federal .9600826    2764335 3.47 0.001 .4167246    1.503441 
Change in unemployment .1659898    .2487958      0.67 0.505 -.3230435    .6550231 
_cons 6.142287    1.106377      5.55 0.000 3.967592    8.316982 
 
Since, 22 out of 28 EU member states are unitary states (14 out of 18 countries in my 
study), I argue that the lack of support for regional parties in my analysis is indeed supportive of 
my economic theory of secession. True subnational politics is very rare, and it takes place in a 
handful of countries in European Union. Countries such as Spain and Belgium represent 
decentralized countries, with high levels of separatist activity, and very prominent regionalist 
parties that have boomed during the current economic crisis.70 The data I have acquired in my 
analysis, due to a high centralization is not representative of the real separatist cases, which is 
why in my next section, my economic theory of secession will be further reconfirmed in my case 
study of Catalonia.  
V. Catalonia 
The territory that nowadays represents the autonomous region of Catalonia represents 
Spain’s richest and highly developed region, with an identifiable and unique Catalan culture. 
Catalan people are known for their strong identity and language, along with being very 
independence oriented. Due to the region’s particular history and distinctive cultural philosophy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 I would have included Scotland in my analysis, however UK is a highly centralized state, and Scottish National 
Party got a very low amount of votes in UK’s parliamentary elections (1% or less), thus being not representative 
enough for my regional sentiment analysis.  
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Catalan people think of themselves as a separate group of people than that of Spain, and 
throughout the years, Catalan political parties have been pursuing full separation and political 
freedom.  
Catalonia’s history has been intertwined with Spanish history and it dates back to middle 
ages. The Spanish Empire was one of the first, modern and global empires in Europe. However, 
it never represented a unified entity and throughout its rich history, Spain has experienced many 
cultural and social clashes. The territory of Spain has been sought after by many different 
civilizations. The Romans and Carthaginians fought over it, the Arabs conquered it, and finally 
in the 15th and 16th century, the Catholic monarchs, queen Isabel and king Aragon of Catalonia, 
converted Spain into one of the most powerful empires in the world.71 Catalonia was the main 
base of power for king Aragon, and throughout his rule, Catalonia developed a very distinctive 
Catalan culture. Nonetheless, the marriage between King Aragon of Catalonia and queen Isabel 
of Spain has transformed Catalonia into a part of the mighty kingdom of Spain.72 For a 
considerable amount of time Catalonia was able to reinstitute its own laws and culture, however 
with the arrival of the Bourbon dynasty in the 18th century, Catalonia was turned into a Spanish 
province.73 This led to the suppression of the Catalan language and culture, while also 
experiencing a diminution of its governmental influence and power. However, the arrival of 
Napoleon in the 18th century destabilized the region and led to a fall of the Bourbon dynasty.74 
The Spanish independence war came as a result of the French Revolution in 1789, which 
eventually led to a proclamation of the Spanish Constitution in 1812, which was ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Kamen, H. (2003). How Spain Became a World Power 1492-1763. (1st ed., p. 6). New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers. 
72 Ibid, p. 6	  
73 Alvarez Nunco, J., & Shubert, A. (2000). Spanish History Since 1808 . (p. 50). London: Arnold. 
74 Ibid, p. 52 
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overturned.75 The rejection of the Constitution had far reaching consequences. Since the 
Constitution of 1812 was written to establish non-discriminatory laws in Spanish colonies (e.g. 
Catalonia), the rejection of the Constitution outraged Spanish colonies and it caused colonies to 
rebel.76 Destabilized by the war, Spain struggled for the next couple of decades to normalize its 
country and bring order to the social system. Economic deprivation along with deep cultural and 
national differences among Spanish and Catalan population, has shaken and torn Spanish 
identity. Since then, Spain has never been able to fully unify different ethnicities into cherishing 
and respecting each other under one national flag. The remainder of the century experienced 
several political changes but none of these changes was able to bring peace and prosperity to the 
Spanish war-torn and poverty-stricken society. In 1876, at the end of the century, Spain’s 
intellectuals proclaimed another constitution and established monarchy under the rule of Alfonso 
XIII.77 Extensive corruption and abuse of governmental power led to opposition movements by 
Catalan and Basque regional leaders. Although Basque regionalism was more violent and 
extreme, it represented less of a threat than Catalan regionalist movements. Due to its own 
language and distinct culture, Spain started experiencing a rise in Catalanism, a form of 
nationalism, which asserts that Catalonia is its own nation with distinct cultural differences than 
those in the rest of Spain. 
Due to the confluence of powerful traditional values, industrialization, and the fall of 
Alfonso’s XIII monarchist regime in 1923, Catalans decided to support the military leader 
Miguel Primo de Rivera in establishing his power.78 The Catalan people wanted to revive their 
cultural, political, and economic freedom and saw a savior in a new Spanish governmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Alvarez Nunco, J., & Shubert, A. (2000). Spanish History Since 1808 . (p. 13). London: Arnold. 
76 Ibid, p. 13	  
77 Ibid, p. 50 
78 Ealham, C., & Richards, M. (2005). The Splintering of Spain. P. 94 New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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regime led by Primo de Rivera. Although Primo de Rivera was very sympathetic to Catalonia’s 
needs, he soon became a Spanish patriot and started purging Catalan people.79 For Catalonia, the 
beginning of the 20th century mirrors in overly emphasized and accentuated cultural, linguistic, 
and national differences between Spaniards and Catalans. During the rein of Primo de Rivera, 
Catalan characteristics were heavily suppressed and fought against reaching its full national, and 
separatist potential. Due to Catalonia’s geographical position, economic richness and prosperity, 
it represented a highly valuable asset, which the previous and future leaders of Spain appreciated 
and held onto with a tight grip. The overthrown of the Primo de Rivera in 1930 carries a lot of 
significance because it gave an inspirational boost to the separatist region of Catalonia to start 
pushing forward with its independence claims. In 1932 Catalonia was granted autonomy, 
however not absolute self-rule.80 Later on, from 1936 until 1939, Spain experienced a dreadful 
civil war due to the rise of socialist sentiment and a lack of steady government.81 Society in 
Spain became intensely polarized, and after many battles and ideological conflicts the party led 
by Francisco Franco won and took control of Spain.82 The Franco era lasted from 1939 until 
1975 and it demonstrated a rise in human rights abuses and repression of opposition. Catalonia 
experienced annulment of its basic liberties, the repression of its culture, disaffirmation of its 
autonomy statute along with the suppression of freedom of press and speech.83 Many Catalans 
were persecuted, killed, or sent to exile. Francisco Franco, although an autocrat, pursued 
different economic policies, which led Spain into becoming one of the most developed nations in 
Europe at the midst of the 20th century. During the economic boom, the Catalan people 
industrialized very quickly, which caused a migration of workers to Barcelona. Along with 
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modernization and an improvement in Spanish economy, along came an even deeper awakening 
of nationalistic sentiment in Catalonia. The cry for independence became louder and louder. 
Many Catalan party leaders along with Catalan workers and bourgeoisie started spreading 
feelings of emotional separatism in order to create a base for the social movement. In 1975, after 
the death of Francisco Franco, Spain started its transition to a democracy. The fall of 
dictatorships culminated in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the establishment of a 
democratic regime.84 Catalonia was recognized as a nationality and the Catalan language became 
co-official with Spanish. Since the 90s Catalonia and its distinctive culture have became more 
accepted and included into the Spanish regime; however Catalan progress toward becoming an 
independent and sovereign country stalled. Through the years Catalan political parties have 
fought for a more efficient representation in the Spanish government, but the results were always 
a plurality instead of a majority.85 On January 23, 2012 the Spanish government declared 
Catalonia a sovereign entity, which gives the Catalan people hope for a referendum and a 
sovereign Catalonia.   
V.I. The EU’s involvement in Catalan affairs 
Francisco Franco’s regime started losing power towards the end of the 1960s. Spain’s left 
wing activists created an antifranquista opposition, in which they denounced Franco’s autocratic 
government, demanded the release of political prisoners, the observance of human rights, and the 
acceptance of all national minorities in Spain. Soon after Franco’s death, the new government 
under Juan Carlos received more popular support because of its pro-liberal and more westernized 
stance on political issues.86 However there were two major problems which the previous regime 
under Francisco Franco had ignored and the new government under Juan Carlos had to face 
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immediately as they stepped into the presidential office. First were the regional questions along 
with the problem of political terrorism. The second issue was the disastrous state of the Spanish 
economy.87 In the 1980s the Spanish government focused on more liberalization and 
deregulation, which reduced government involvement in the capitalist market.88 Due to many 
profound structural transformations, Spain was able to join the European Union in 1986 and start 
a new era of pro-European, democratic, and more powerful political system.89 The European 
Union regulations had a direct influence on the positive internal change in Spain’s domestic 
affairs. Throughout its negotiations with the European Union, Spain was reminded and advised 
to include its autonomous provinces in its dialogues with the EU, and since their interest is also 
affected by the EU’s reforms, Spain should incorporate and inform its autonomous regions of the 
developments related to its affairs.90 Due to its intense regional pressure, in 1996 Spain reached 
an agreement with the EU on the possibility of its regional representatives taking part in the EU’s 
Department for Regional Affairs (REPER).91 In 2004 a political focus shifted at fostering and 
bettering participation of Spanish autonomous communities in the European Union’s decision-
making bodies.92 Whenever Spain debates about certain issues that affect regional competences, 
Spain’s autonomous provinces have a voice to declare their stance and stand against modern 
oppression. However, the Spanish state is overall responsible for the implementation of the EU 
and domestic policies, and as such, the Spanish government very often encounters gridlocks and 
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interest conflicts with the regional, minority representatives. Although the EU has proclaimed 
that the regions are directly involved in the processes of the EU, the national channels through 
which this collaboration is supposed to be established is often strategically interrupted due to 
various governmental self-interests and lobbying. Many EU related issues such as EU’s 
empowerment of regional representatives in Spain, EU regional economic policies and also the 
EU’s somewhat blunt stance on secession related issues, have enabled Catalonia to pursue its 
interest more aggressively. Due to the EU’s fear of separatism and possible fragmentation of the 
EU regional entities, the EU has ambiguously kept its mouth shut. With the division of the EU 
member states, the European Union’s dream and dedication of assimilating all its member states 
into one big identity-distinctive community is shattered. A combination of the EU economic 
crisis and vague federal, territorial integrity sheds light on the strength of Catalan national 
identity and it portrays the possible amplification of Catalan separatist claims by the EU 
economic policies and the EU’s provision of regional funds.  
With the establishment and the rise in EU importance, Catalonia is confronted with a 
significantly valuable international player, which in the case of Catalonia’s separatism might be 
capable of fueling regional confidence. The EU represents a medium between Spanish and 
Catalan authorities, and as such, it gives Catalonia certain political and economic tools, which 
enable Catalan political parties toward pursuing more confidently and more independently their 
spot as the 29th EU member state. Due to Catalonia’s extensive battle with Spanish authorities 
throughout the years, and its economic suffering, which came as a result of Spain taking more 
valuable resources from Catalan economy, Catalan population perceives EU as a political asylum 
where it can freely nest its political goals and dreams. 	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V.I. Methodology II 
 The reason why I selected Catalonia as my case study is because it has an extensive 
historical separatist battle with Spain and because of its current exposure as one of the EU’s 
future exceptions of separatism. Due to its prolonged history with Spain and many social, 
economic, and political difficulties at the European level, the small regional entity of Catalonia 
recently started putting more pressure on Spain and on the European Union toward enabling its 
secession and full sovereignty as an independent state. In the last decade the EU has gone 
through many structural and power-distribution changes that have shed light on many of its 
weaknesses, which Catalonia is wholeheartedly taking advantage of. Since the establishment of 
the European Union in 195893 the EU has become a medium for Catalan leaders to express their 
grievances toward alleged suppression and unjust rule by Spain’s authorities. Throughout its 
history Catalonia has demonstrated its commitment to overthrowing the “foreign” power of 
Spain and establishing its self-rule. For these historical, political and mostly economic reasons, I 
decided to focus on Catalonia as my case study. I acknowledge that an economic correlation with 
a separatist sentiment represents an imperfect analysis of a current situation in Spain, however 
due to Catalonia’s current very adamant political exposure, I argue that a trembling economic 
situation at the EU level has gave confidence to an already strong Catalan separatist sentiment.   
 I have conducted a small public opinion analysis of Catalan support for more autonomous 
governance. Graph #5 exemplifies a rise in public support for more autonomy in Catalonia. I 
collected the public opinion data from the Catalan government website, and the question being 
asked to Catalan public was: Do you think that Catalonia has achieved, a) too much autonomy? 
b) A sufficient level of autonomy? c) An insufficient level of autonomy? As the graph suggests, 
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there has been an increase in regionalist sentiment, aka support for more autonomy, thus 
implying that Catalan public is supportive of Catalonia becoming an independent state.  
GRAPH 5 
       
 Overall, I believe that there is much more to Catalan separatist claims, than their strong 
national identity. Throughout Catalan history, its strong nationalistic sentiment and pursuit for 
more autonomous governance and fair fiscal treatment has been present. Spain’s reluctance to 
introduce “measures of fiscal federalism” has put the unfair fiscal treatment at the core of the 
Catalan separatist claims.94 Since Franco’s dictatorial regime ended in 1978, and democracy was 
finally established, Catalonia has demanded its fiscal sovereignty and more political 
independence.95 In the last couple of years, discussion of Catalan separatism has intensified, 
putting the Catalan lasting economic deprivation at the center of the separatist debate. Perception 
of mistreatment, along with a strong regional attachment has definitely contributed toward an 
increase in separatist claims. However, fiscal autonomy and economic imbalance have remained 
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as one of the main issues and demands Catalan public has emphasized and strived for throughout 
the years.  
Although Catalan separatist battle with Spain is growing, separation is not yet set in 
stone, and the possibility exists that if Spanish authorities fix the economic imbalance, Catalan 
public might rationalize and back down on supporting separatism. Is the support for Catalan 
separation a “reactive movement” due to nation-state’s unwillingness to legislate fiscal 
autonomy and accept devolution of powers?96 Or is it a genuine historical request for separation 
simply extra fueled by economic recession?  
V.II. Data analysis 
 In my analysis of Catalonia I focused on the same variables as above. However, since I 
was able to acquire data on Catalan separatist sentiment from Catalan government, I have also 
used Catalan support for autonomy as an indicator of Catalan regional sentiment. The graph #6 
exemplifies the relationship between Catalan separatist sentiment and EU’s distribution of 
regional funds. The graph implies that there is a negative relationship between the two variables. 
It suggests that whenever regional funds decrease, separatist sentiment increases. Since Spain 
represents a quasi federal state, not all its regional entities have fiscal autonomy. Catalonia is one 
of these regions yet to achieve full fiscal autonomy. Due to its dependence on the national 
governments funds distribution, and representation in the EU commission, Catalan public 
responds to the economic crisis by supporting its regional demands for independence. This 
relationship entails that when Catalan economy is blooming, regional demands for separatism are 
lower. However, when economy is doing bad, regional demands for separatism are increasing. 
Graph #6 also suggests that structural funds being given to Catalonia has significantly decreased 
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since 2007. Thus suggesting that less money to the region, leads to higher support for separatism. 
Due to a lack of more comparative data, I am not able to look at Catalan separatist sentiment 
before 2005. However, during 2005 and 2006 public opinion polls, we see that the while regional 
funds were increasing, separatist sentiment was decreasing, which suggests that Catalan outcry 
for separatism might be a “reactive movement” fueled by an economic crisis. 	  
GRAPH 6
	   
	   Furthermore, I have compared regional party vote share with the distribution of regional 
funds. Graph #7 suggests that when regions are getting more regional funds, regional party vote 
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Spain’s national government, by increasing its support for more autonomy. This diverse 
relationship might be occurring due to Spanish quasi federal regime, and it is consistent with the 
economic theory of secessionism. 
GRAPH 7 
	  	  
	   Consequently, graph #8 shows a relationship between Catalan’s support for autonomy, 
unemployment and real GDP growth. The graph indicates that as unemployment increases, and 
as real GDP growth decreases, Catalan support for autonomy increases. Thus, the relationship 
between these three variables suggests that when the economy is bad, support for Catalan 
separatism increases. This relationship entails that the EU economy indeed has an effect on 
subnational regions, where separatist sentiment is pre-established. 	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GRAPH 8 
 
VI. Conclusion 
With the conception of the EU and with its devolution of authority, subnational regions 
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regions more prone to separatism. My economic theory of secession implies that the rise in 
separatist sentiment is conditional as to whether the country has a unitary or federal political 
system. Meaning, in unitary countries when the economy is doing bad, regional sentiment 
decreases. On the contrary, in federal countries when the economy is doing bad, regional 
sentiment increases. 
 By being a part of the EU regional separatist claims became much prominent and more 
assertive.  The inability of the nation-state to deal properly with the economic crisis, 
unemployment, and other economy related issues, implies that with a heterogeneous and 
ethically divided society, such as Catalonia, EU member states, with Spain in particular, create a 
climate in which separatist sentiment is heavily induced. As shown in my analysis of Catalonia, 
separatist sentiment has increased as the economy has worsened. I do acknowledge that 
Catalonia’s previously established separatist sentiment has an effect on Catalonia’s rise in 
separatist sentiment as a whole. However, as data has pointed out, Catalan regionalist parties 
vote share, along with Catalan demands for more autonomy, have experienced an upward trend 
due to EU’s difficult economic situation. The case of Catalonia points out that federalism, 
previously established separatist sentiment, and the presence of a prosperous region represent 
three pillars that might be responsible for establishing a strong separatist sentiment. These three 
pillars represent a possible set of conditions necessary for fueling a preexistent separatist 
sentiment and also inspiration for some of my future research. 
Overall, is a bad economic situation at the EU level truly responsible for the rise in 
separatist movements? The EU economy might not be the one and only reason why certain 
subnational entities are demanding independence. However, one cannot deny that the EU 
economy exemplifies a casual determinant partially accountable for an increase in regionalist 
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demands for independence. The regions of Catalonia and Scotland are only a referendum away 
from becoming fully independent countries. Many scholars have divided opinions on this 
relevant issue. Some believe that the EU strict membership policies and perceived economic 
reliance on the nation state will deter Scotland and Catalonia from seeking further separation. 
However, other scholars believe that deeply rooted separatist issues mixed with a difficult 
economic situation at the EU level will further exacerbate Catalan and Scottish separatist 
sentiment. Nonetheless, the direct (regional funds) and indirect (unemployment, real GDP) 
effects of the EU economy play and will continue to play an important role in the further 
development of subnational behavior. By offering more political opportunities to its regions, the 
EU is fostering and pushing nation-states into becoming more globalized and somewhat federal 
entities, thus promoting regionalism, regional economic independence, and secession.  
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